He suggests that they have a bad communication strategy. Don't get me wrong I tend to be cautious in anything a Mr. Yates might say about the current Syrzia as I tend to think that most orthodox econ types like him aren't exactly sympathetic politically speaking.
I mean we know Sumner's hostile, and my guess is that most mainstream econ types are. Yates is one of those who really feels like if you're from outside the econ mainstream you really aren't even qualified to criticize what goes on inside it.
http://diaryofarepublicanhater.blogspot.com/2013/12/tony-yates-inside-mind-of-your-average.html
Nevertheless, here what he says seems to have some resonance. He suggests that Syrzia really wasn't ready for victory-they assumed that they'd need help giving the Center Left it's victory, and assumed they'd have to water down their demands before even speaking to the Troika.
Now they really don't know what to demand or even what their position is which among other negative effects of such apparent indecision is it will weaken them before the Troika.
"There is a remarkable amount of cross-section variation (ie across different Syriza representatives) and time-series variation in what is being demanded or proposed. We have had variation on how to treat legacy debt; the difference between G and T going forwards (the primary surplus), and even who would be dealt with."
"This makes me think that they had not thought through clearly what they would say they would do or wanted, nor what they would actually do and accept."
"If that’s the case, perhaps they were caught out by how many seats they won, and had only wargamed on the assumption that they would have to form a centre-left coalition and water down their demands at the outset, at the point of coalition-formation, ie before confronting the Troika."
"If 3 was right, that would account for why the detail behind the more robust demands was not there, and why the tough line was hard to maintain."
"The Troika might take it as a sign of weakness, take heart, and try to ram home a solution too close to the status quo, which ultimately fails."
"All this is a shame, because as many have observed, even if there is an agreement to be had, the dispute could still end in Grexit by accident."
https://longandvariable.wordpress.com/2015/02/03/syrizas-communications-strategy/
I have to say that I've been struck by the fact that Syrzia already has been declaring it won't leave the euro. This begs where exactly the stick is to go with their carrot when dealing with the Troika.
I mean we know Sumner's hostile, and my guess is that most mainstream econ types are. Yates is one of those who really feels like if you're from outside the econ mainstream you really aren't even qualified to criticize what goes on inside it.
http://diaryofarepublicanhater.blogspot.com/2013/12/tony-yates-inside-mind-of-your-average.html
Nevertheless, here what he says seems to have some resonance. He suggests that Syrzia really wasn't ready for victory-they assumed that they'd need help giving the Center Left it's victory, and assumed they'd have to water down their demands before even speaking to the Troika.
Now they really don't know what to demand or even what their position is which among other negative effects of such apparent indecision is it will weaken them before the Troika.
"There is a remarkable amount of cross-section variation (ie across different Syriza representatives) and time-series variation in what is being demanded or proposed. We have had variation on how to treat legacy debt; the difference between G and T going forwards (the primary surplus), and even who would be dealt with."
"This makes me think that they had not thought through clearly what they would say they would do or wanted, nor what they would actually do and accept."
"If that’s the case, perhaps they were caught out by how many seats they won, and had only wargamed on the assumption that they would have to form a centre-left coalition and water down their demands at the outset, at the point of coalition-formation, ie before confronting the Troika."
"If 3 was right, that would account for why the detail behind the more robust demands was not there, and why the tough line was hard to maintain."
"The Troika might take it as a sign of weakness, take heart, and try to ram home a solution too close to the status quo, which ultimately fails."
"All this is a shame, because as many have observed, even if there is an agreement to be had, the dispute could still end in Grexit by accident."
https://longandvariable.wordpress.com/2015/02/03/syrizas-communications-strategy/
I have to say that I've been struck by the fact that Syrzia already has been declaring it won't leave the euro. This begs where exactly the stick is to go with their carrot when dealing with the Troika.
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