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Sunday, March 31, 2013

Lord Keynes Brings Clarity to Bob Murphy's Confusion

     I already have written this morning about Murphy's latest attempt to libel Krugman. First it was "Aha! Krugman loves booms!" Then it was "Aha! Krugman ignores the Civil War and the Depression of the 1870s!"

     http://diaryofarepublicanhater.blogspot.com/2013/03/what-will-bob-murphy-accuse-krugman-of.html

     It's quite amazing the lengths he'll go to to get a gotcha moment on Krugman. To me the argument was totally specious:

      "In a post titled, “Debasing Lincoln” Krugman writes:

Greg Sargent catches John Boehner invoking none other than Abraham Lincoln to inveigh against the deficit. This is pretty funny — in multiple ways.
One is the whole notion of relying on Lincoln as an authority on economic policy. Why should we believe that a lawyer speaking in 1843…knew what we should be doing about an economic slump…170 years later?
Then there’s Greg’s catch: Boehner truncated the quote, leaving out the part where Lincoln called for balancing the budget by raising taxes. And also the point that Lincoln was actually a big government interventionist for his time, a strong advocate of what we would now call industrial policy.
But wait: there’s more. Lincoln’s most dramatic departure from standard economic policy was … drumroll .. debasing the currency (pdf). Here’s the dollar price of gold:
True, he did it to pay for a war; but do you think a 19th-century version of Paul Ryan would have stroked his immense beard and said “Well, under the circumstances, letting the dollar fall to a third of its gold parity is OK?”
Actually, the greenback experience is interesting, mainly for two reasons: nothing terrible happened despite 15 years off the gold standard, and despite this fact all the Very Serious People continued to believe that going off the gold standard was a terrible, terrible thing. It doesn’t much raise your hopes that they’ll learn from recent failures. [Bold added.]
      "Wow, where to begin?"
      "First, note the irony here. Krugman is chastising John Boehner for not realizing that Lincoln was a tax-raising, big government advocate of industrial policy, who also debased the currency. And yet, when Tom DiLorenzo was a witness for Ron Paul’s monetary committee, Krugman summarized the episode with a blog post titled “Johnny Reb Economics.” His good buddy Matt Yglesias had an even more inflammatory title, “The Strange Case of Pro-Confederate Monetary Policy.” (In fairness, maybe the editors at ThinkProgress pick their blog post titles.) So it seems if you call Lincoln a big government fascist, you get your head bitten off, and if you cast Lincoln as a small government conservative, you get mocked. Tough crowd, these progressive bloggers."
     "But that’s just incidental. The real jaw-dropper in Krugman’s post above, is his claim that “nothing terrible happened” from 1862 to 1878, and that therefore the Very Serious People who worried about Lincoln going off gold are proven wrong once again."
     "Naturally, there was the whole Civil War (aka War Between the States aka War of Northern Aggression), with hundreds of thousands of people dying. So obviously the economy was in awful shape during these years."
     Gotcha Krugman! You forgot about the Civil War! Next Murphy zaps him for forgetting the Depression of the 1870s:
      "Let’s continue, to prove my point. After the Civil War, but when the U.S. was still not back to dollar parity with gold, did we have any kind of economic problems? After all, Krugman’s chart–and his statement “despite 15 years off the gold standard”–show that we need to consider U.S. economic history from 1866 to 1878, if we want to see what the postwar era was like."
       "Here’s an interesting idea: Before we look it up, let’s first settle something obvious. If there had been, oh I don’t know, the worst depression in U.S. history to that point, then probably that would count as “something terrible” happening, right? Maybe it wouldn’t be the fault of going off gold, but surely Krugman would be either a liar or ignorant if he said “nothing terrible happened,” right?"
      "Well there was this thing called the “long depression,” which the NBER dates from October 1873 to March 1879. Here’s how Wikipedia describes it:
The Long Depression was a worldwide economic recession, beginning in 1873 and running through the spring of 1879. It was the most severe in Europe and the United States, which had been experiencing strong economic growth fueled by the Second Industrial Revolution in the decade following the American Civil War. At the time, the episode was labeled the Great Depression and held that designation until the Great Depression of the 1930s. Though a period of general deflation and low growth, it did not have the severe economic retrogression of the Great Depression.[1]
It was most notable in Western Europe and North America, at least in part because reliable data from the period are most readily available in those parts of the world. The United Kingdom is often considered to have been the hardest hit; during this period it lost some of its large industrial lead over the economies of Continental Europe.[2] While it was occurring, the view was prominent that the economy of the United Kingdom had been in continuous depression from 1873 to as late as 1896 and some texts refer to the period as the Great Depression of 1873–96.[3]
In the United States, economists typically refer to the Long Depression as the Depression of 1873–79, kicked off by the Panic of 1873, and followed by the Panic of 1893, book-ending the entire period of the wider Long Depression.[4] The National Bureau of Economic Research dates the contraction following the panic as lasting from October 1873 to March 1879. At 65 months, it is the longest-lasting contraction identified by the NBER, eclipsing the Great Depression’s 43 months of contraction.[5][6]
In the US, from 1873–1879, 18,000 businesses went bankrupt, including hundreds of banks, and ten states went bankrupt,[7] while unemployment peaked at 14% in 1876,[8] long after the panic ended.
     "This is simply inexcusable. And as I have taken pains to point out over the years, this is typical Krugman. He simply makes stuff up about the historical “record,” with such carelessness in throwaway lines that when you catch him, his fans won’t even care. To wit: “Oh come on Bob, it’s not like Krugman said, ‘The Long Depression wasn’t terrible.’ All he meant was, Lincoln’s debasement of the currency had no ill effects. The Long Depression wasn’t about gold at all; there was deflation!”
      If you think I'm exaggerating that this is all about his obsession with finding a smoking gun on Krugman check out his snarky rejoinder to me and fellow Keyensian Lord Keynes in the comments:
       "You guys (by which I mean Mike Sax and Lord Keynes) are awesome. You are actually saying:"
      “Sure Krugman’s argument makes no sense at all. But why you think that is somehow a smoking gun that Krugman writes bad blog posts, is beyond me. The earth didn’t cave in when Lincoln went off gold, so clearly the gold standard is stupid.”
        He honestly thinks that if he finds the right smoking gun he'll be able to literally destroy Krugman's reputation and no one will ever read his columns or interview him on tv again. As to the gold standard, whether or not you want to call it "stupid" I find today's gold bugs pretty stupid, that much I'll concede. 
        Daniel Kuehn, a New Keynesian type that often comments at Bob's argues that Krugman was careless in saying "nothing terrible happened despite 15 years off the gold standard" as some terrible things did happen-the Civil War and it's human and economic effects and the 1870s depression. Ie, all these terrible things that did happen during the 15 year period were "noise" and kind of drown out Krugman's point. 
         I disagree with this. I think what Krugman was getting at was clear enough. As for noise, well, it's up to economists to not allow noise to distract them. Bob is trying to use noise here to distract from the real issues. 
        Lord Keynes however, brings some actual reality back to the free for all over at Bob's by providing some actual facts about the period. What we learn from him is that if Krugman had felt a need to delve more deeply into the period of 1862-1877 it would actually have strengthened his case considerably.  For one thing Krugman may have been somewhat imprecise in calling the Greenback period 1862-1877. 
       When we delve more deeply into the 1870s period we discover that the depression of the 70s was caused by deep deflation:
       " First, if Krugman declared that the greenback era was from 1862 to 1878, then he is wrong, and you would have done better to examine whether his statement was true."
       "As Yosef points out, 1873-1879 is hardly to be considered a “greenback” era. It was a deflationary era:
(1) by 1868 the Treasury had already withdrawn $100 million in greenbacks;
(2) the Coinage Act of 1873 was deflationary:
The Fourth Coinage Act was enacted by the United States Congress in 1873; it embraced the gold standard, and demonetized silver. Western mining interests and others who wanted silver in circulation years later labeled this measure the “Crime of ’73″[1]. Gold became the only metallic standard in the United States, hence putting the United States de facto on the gold standard.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coinage_Act_of_1873
(3) in 1874, “hard money” supporters persuaded Grant to veto a bill to print more money;
(4) in 1875, the “hard money” victory was nearly complete: they got the Resumption Act passed and the
Treasury began to acquire gold reserves by federal surpluses and borrowing to back the greenbacks in circulation, further inflicting a deflationary bias.
      LK then goes on to point out that Murphy's narrative of this period, interestingly enough, conflicts with Rothbard's who actually claimed, ironically enough that during the 1870s: basically nothing happened, and that the depression of that decade is a myth perpetuated by Keynesian inflationists to libel an era of low prices but no depression.
       "It should be clear, then, that the ‘great depression’ of the 1870s is merely a myth—a myth brought about by misinterpretation of the fact that prices in general fell sharply during the entire period. Indeed they fell from the end of the Civil War until 1879. Friedman and Schwartz estimated that prices in general fell from 1869 to 1879 by 3.8 percent per annum. Unfortunately, most historians and economists are conditioned to believe that steadily and sharply falling prices must result in depression: hence their amazement at the obvious prosperity and economic growth during this era. For they have overlooked the fact that in the natural course of events, when government and the banking system do not increase the money supply very rapidly, free-market capitalism will result in an increase of production and economic growth so great as to swamp the increase of money supply. Prices will fall, and the consequences will be not depression or stagnation, but prosperity (since costs are falling, too) economic growth, and the spread of the increased living standard to all the consumers.” (Rothbard 2002: 154–155)."
       Good job LK! At least some one is dabbling in actual history rather than historical fiction. 
        

What Will Bob Murphy Accuse Krugman of Next?

     Each blog title seems to be a further escalation against Krugman. His last post accused Krugman of "loving booms"-terrible thing! We should all love stagnation like Tyler Cowen.

     http://diaryofarepublicanhater.blogspot.com/2013/03/bob-murphy-takes-on-krugman-defender.html

      Now Krugman is accused of ignoring the massive suffering of the Civil War and the depression that started in 1873. How's this for a reach:

      "In a post titled, “Debasing Lincoln” Krugman writes:
Greg Sargent catches John Boehner invoking none other than Abraham Lincoln to inveigh against the deficit. This is pretty funny — in multiple ways.
One is the whole notion of relying on Lincoln as an authority on economic policy. Why should we believe that a lawyer speaking in 1843…knew what we should be doing about an economic slump…170 years later?
Then there’s Greg’s catch: Boehner truncated the quote, leaving out the part where Lincoln called for balancing the budget by raising taxes. And also the point that Lincoln was actually a big government interventionist for his time, a strong advocate of what we would now call industrial policy.
But wait: there’s more. Lincoln’s most dramatic departure from standard economic policy was … drumroll .. debasing the currency (pdf). Here’s the dollar price of gold:
True, he did it to pay for a war; but do you think a 19th-century version of Paul Ryan would have stroked his immense beard and said “Well, under the circumstances, letting the dollar fall to a third of its gold parity is OK?”
Actually, the greenback experience is interesting, mainly for two reasons: nothing terrible happened despite 15 years off the gold standard, and despite this fact all the Very Serious People continued to believe that going off the gold standard was a terrible, terrible thing. It doesn’t much raise your hopes that they’ll learn from recent failures. [Bold added.]
       "Wow, where to begin?"
       "First, note the irony here. Krugman is chastising John Boehner for not realizing that Lincoln was a tax-raising, big government advocate of industrial policy, who also debased the currency. And yet, when Tom DiLorenzo was a witness for Ron Paul’s monetary committee, Krugman summarized the episode with a blog post titled “Johnny Reb Economics.” His good buddy Matt Yglesias had an even more inflammatory title, “The Strange Case of Pro-Confederate Monetary Policy.” (In fairness, maybe the editors at ThinkProgress pick their blog post titles.) So it seems if you call Lincoln a big government fascist, you get your head bitten off, and if you cast Lincoln as a small government conservative, you get mocked. Tough crowd, these progressive bloggers."
       "But that’s just incidental. The real jaw-dropper in Krugman’s post above, is his claim that “nothing terrible happened” from 1862 to 1878, and that therefore the Very Serious People who worried about Lincoln going off gold are proven wrong once again."
       "Naturally, there was the whole Civil War (aka War Between the States aka War of Northern Aggression), with hundreds of thousands of people dying. So obviously the economy was in awful shape during these years."
        "NOTE: I am not saying, “Krugman thinks hundreds of thousands of people dying is no big deal!” No, what I’m saying is that he isn’t in any way looking at any kind of metric when he says “nothing terrible happened.” That is a throwaway line, anchored to jack squat. For one simple example, the last time I looked up the stats, I ballparked cumulative price inflation in the North at about 75 percent from 1861 to 1864, for an annualized rate of 20 percent for that three-year stretch. (It was far worse in the Confederacy of course, just proving how ridiculous it is to say Tom DiLorenzo was a fan of Confederate monetary policy.) Isn’t that the most obvious “terrible thing” that a gold bug would bring up? Yet Krugman doesn’t even bother to tell us anything about prices; he just assures us “nothing terrible happened.”
      Ok. What's next? He's going to play the Nazi card. Indeed in the comments he did:
       " It’s akin to when people mock those who said (when Britain went off gold in the early 1930s) that it was the end of Western civilization. As if the events of the 1930s and 1940s couldn’t plausibly be classified as the end of Western civilization."
         Yet in the comments, the alleged Keynesian Daniel Kuehn was defending Murphy from my attacks:
         " Dude – he’s not making a case for the gold standard here. He is criticizing the quality of the case made by Krugman against it."
          "I agree Bob’s smoking guns are often quite flimsy – and I don’t think this is a smoking gun either for any kind of deeper problem that is unique to Krugman. But I think you’re barking up the wrong tree here."
          Well, look. The fact that both Daniel and I go by the name "Keynesian" in some way doesn't mean we always have to agree-he is more of a New Keynesian anyway and probably a little more conservative than I am. I wonder if he somehow is desperately wanting the approval of these Austrians. Yet I stand but what I said. Murphy is acting as an apologist of the gold standard. If you really thought he made a point in the Krugman argument notice what he did in the comment about WWII. He's suggesting that the gold bugs in the early 30s were right-or at least weren't wrong because WWII happened. 
           As usual then, Murphy is taking all kinds of liberties with the correlation-causation distinction. Because Britain got off the gold standard in 1931 and was in WWII in 1940 this proves the gold bugs were right-or suggest they weren't wrong. This idea that "well they at least weren't obviously wrong" is classic concern trolling where he sneaks in his gold buggery apologetics through the back door. Much as he got in his confederacy apologetics through the back door:
         "Naturally, there was the whole Civil War (aka War Between the States aka War of Northern Aggression), with hundreds of thousands of people dying. So obviously the economy was in awful shape during these years."
          At most, Daniel is admitting that Murphy's case is flimsy, just that he doesn't think Murphy is actually apologizing for the gold standard here. It's a rather tendentious distinction. At the end of the day, though, Murphy is quibbling over some pretty small beer. I've got to assume that if he had better arguments to make against Krugman he'd make them. 

Saturday, March 30, 2013

Bob Murphy Takes on a Krugman Defender

     I guess this is a matter of good news and good news as the Krugman defender he has in mind is yours truly:

     "A few posts ago, I pointed out that Krugman unintentionally let slip the fact that he wants policies that reignite a boom. Naturally, a Krugman defender said I was nuts in the comments."

     http://consultingbyrpm.com/blog/2013/03/more-on-keynesians-loving-the-boom.html#comments

     Now I don't know about this whole idea in his title on "Keynesians loving the boom"-we'll actually have to unpack that. However, let me say that I love having my comments referenced in Murphy's post. For the record, I never quite said he is nuts. I don't have any reason to think that he is. I suspect maybe he thinks I and all Keynesians are nuts.

     Bob Roddis certainly, whether or not he thinks they're all nuts or not, has a very low opinion of them, seeing us all as basically beneath the pale:

     "it is pointless and foolish to treat Keynesians as serious, thoughtful and/or honorable." 

     So I'm not sure who Bob Murphy thinks is calling who nuts. I was just explaining that in my view he has Krugman all wrong when he said this:

      "I’m not going to bother with a full write-up, but in this post Krugman makes a joke, but inadvertently reveals what we’ve been saying all along: His solution to a depressed economy is to ignite a boom. In this particular post, Krugman is ridiculing the idea that Ireland is in recovery, because they’re not in a boom. Since Ireland isn’t currently in a boom–according to the logic behind Krugman’s sarcastic quip–the policies in Ireland must be bad."
      
      My point was simply that's not what Krugman was saying. It might get a little confusing here: I'm addressing Bob Murphy the blogger, not Bob Roddis the commentator who writes his own blog, though his posts are pretty irregular these days.

      http://bobroddis.blogspot.com/2013/03/a-clueless-stephanie-kelton-on-thom.html#comment-form

      Here was answer to Bob Murphy:

      "Bob if there were no Krugman what would you write about? He wasn’t saying that Ireland’s policies “must have been bad” because there was “no boom.”

      "His point was that it’s still way beneath it’s 2007 high and historical trend. There remains a major output gap that it hasn’t even made up a third of."
     "Now I don’t have the formal background in Econ that you guys have but I’m aware that in mainstream economics an economy can’t even pretend to have healed until it at least makes up the previous output gap. Ireland has very far to go."
    "Or are you taking a page out of Tyler Cowen’s book and declaring Ireland in the throes of a Great Stagnation where this is the new normal?"
     Actually between responses to my comment both from Roddis and "George"-Major Freedom?-what seems to be emerging is this. Austrians don't think the goal of fiscal policy is to engineer a recovery. Basically they do agree with Cowen's Great Stagnation. Listen here to another Austrian-"David" who I'm pretty sure is Major Freedom-who left a recent response to Krugman:
       "It is wrong to believe that Ireland's GDP has to grow back to where it was during the boom. The whole point of austerity is to get people to live within their means. We should EXPECT real GDP to be lower today than during the boom, and to stay there for a long time, until productivity grows to match the boom time GDP."
      "To expect GDP to be as high soon after a boom as during a boom, is like believing a debt ridden profligate consumer who finally goes bankrupt should soon have the same standard of living as they did during their consumption binge."

      "The point of austerity is not to mimic unsustainable growth trends. It is to put growth trends on what they should have been all along, and in Ireland's case, lower than during the boom."


     Ok. The goal of Austrian fiscal policy is actually low and faltering GDP growth. I think then the Austrians should declare success. We have subpar growth in both the U.S. and Europe-in Europe it's actually negative again, so they're Austrian policies were superior to ours as they achieved a double dip. In other works for them Cowen's Great Stagnation is more than just a prediction: it's a policy objective. 

     As Krugman would say, Good job gentlemen! 

Krugman vs. Cato on Capital Controls

     We've already had a few good discussions out of this and now Cato is striking out at Krugman for supposedly blessing controls.

     "Nobelist Paul Krugman has a propensity to spin and conceal. This allows for deception – the type of thing that hoodwinks some readers of his New York Times column. While deception doesn’t qualify as lying, it also fails to qualify as truth-telling."

      http://www.cato.org/blog/hayek-v-krugman-cyprus-capital-controls

      It seems a little rich for Cato to be accusing someone of a propensity to spin an conceal or to "fail to qualify as truth-telling." And lo and behold, this doesn't sound like "truth-telling."

      "Prof. Krugman’s New York Times column, “Hot Money Blues” (25 March 2013) is a case in point. Prof. Krugman sprinkles holy water on the capital controls that will be imposed in Cyprus. He further praises to the sky the post-1980 capital controls that were introduced in a number of other countries."

      I don't know that Krugman quite 'praised capital controls to the sky.' He did suggest that they can in certain circumstances in certain countries be necessary. He also points out that during the immediate postwar era through 1979 we didn't have the financial crises that have become commonplace since:

       "In the first couple of decades after World War II, limits on cross-border money flows were widely considered good policy; they were more or less universal in poorer nations, and present in a majority of richer countries too. Britain, for example, limited overseas investments by its residents until 1979; other advanced countries maintained restrictions into the 1980s. Even the United States briefly limited capital outflows during the 1960s."

      "It’s hard to imagine now, but for more than three decades after World War II financial crises of the kind we’ve lately become so familiar with hardly ever happened. Since 1980, however, the roster has been impressive: Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Chile in 1982. Sweden and Finland in 1991. Mexico again in 1995. Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Korea in 1998. Argentina again in 2002. And, of course, the more recent run of disasters: Iceland, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Cyprus."

      http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/25/opinion/krugman-hot-money-blues.html?_r=0

      Again, not to belabor it, but there's more than a little irony in Cato accusing Krugman or anyone else of spin or being less than successful in truth telling. They claimed that he praised countries that used controls in the post 1980 period to the sky. In fact he said this:

      "countries that did step in to limit capital flows — like Malaysia, which imposed what amounted to a curfew on capital flight in 1998 — were treated almost as pariahs. Surely they would be punished for defying the gods of the market!" 

      That's it. IN addition they further accuse him here:

       Prof. Krugman then takes a characteristic whack at all those “ideologues” who might dare to question the desirability of capital controls:
But the truth, hard as it may be for ideologues to accept, is that unrestricted movement of capital is looking more and more like a failed experiment.
       "Fine. But, not once did Prof. Krugman mention that there just might be a significant cost associated with the imposition of capital controls – a cost with which Prof. Krugman is surely familiar."
        Actually he did mention that there can be costs:
         "Over time, however, these restrictions fell out of fashion. To some extent this reflected the fact that capital controls have potential costs: they impose extra burdens of paperwork, they make business operations more difficult, and conventional economic analysis says that they should have a negative impact on growth (although this effect is hard to find in the numbers)."
         Cato then cinches its case by quoting Hayek:      
        Before more politicians fall under the spell of capital controls, they should take note of what another Nobelist, Friedrich Hayek, had to say in his 1944 classic, The Road to Serfdom:
The extent of the control over all life that economic control confers is nowhere better illustrated than in the field of foreign exchanges. Nothing would at first seem to affect private life less than a state control of the dealings in foreign exchange, and most people will regard its introduction with complete indifference. Yet the experience of most Continental countries has taught thoughtful people to regard this step as the decisive advance on the path to totalitarianism and the suppression of individual liberty. It is, in fact, the complete delivery of the individual to the tyranny of the state, the final suppression of all means of escape—not merely for the rich but for everybody.
        "When it comes to capital controls, I think the Cypriots – even the non-ideologues – might be inclined to agree with Hayek over Krugman."
        Note what Krugman had observed above: that there isn't much that we can really say about capital controls in the evidence. Here we get another theoretical argument from Hayek prior to the age of capital controls. Hayek seems to here be inventing a new explanation for the horrors of WWII: the capital controls made Hitler do it. 
        Again, I've said myself that capital controls are not a panacea. However there are times they may be justified-Cyprus here in 2013 looks like such a case. Krugman is not so much praising controls to the heavens as criticizing the ideology of those like Cato who praise the absence of controls to the heavens. 

         
      

Bob Murphy Gets His Debate With Warren Mosler

     He'd been agitating to get Krugman to debate him for a while, to no avail. Krugman, as best as I can see, doesn't much like debates. He may not be great at them either-though he showed some improvement against Scarborough on Charlie Rose recently.

    Then too, let's be honest. There's the element of status. Krugman's high status means there isn't necessarily much for him to gain in debating Murphy. What it does for both Mosler and Murphy comparatively is at least increase visibility. Either of them probably have more to gain than Krugman would have.

     Here's the announcement:

     "Charles Hayden has informed me that both parties have accepted the invitation to debate, since it appears that Paul Krugman has decided not to accept Robert Murphy's challenge"

      "Details to be announced when the venue is settled. Stay tuned. It's on.


      http://mikenormaneconomics.blogspot.com/2013/03/robert-murphy-and-warren-mosler-to.html

      Lord Keynes suggests one very fertile area for Mosler is Murphy's own position on interest rates: in contradiction to most Austrians he sees interest rates as a monetary phenomenon:

      Murphy is something of a maverick who thinks that the interest rate is a monetary phenomenon, both in his PhD Unanticipated Intertemporal Change in Theories of Interest (2003) and in this post. That is, he rejects the widespread Austrian theory of interest: pure time preference theory.

       http://socialdemocracy21stcentury.blogspot.com/2013/03/warren-mosler-to-debate-robert-murphy.html

       This certainly is a big deal. One of the major ways that Keynes was revolutionary was in seeing interest rates not as compensation for "waiting" or "abstinence" from consumption but rather for giving up liquidity. So how exactly is Murphy able to reject Keynesianism out of hand while conceding such a major point?

       "Sorry kids–Major Freedom in particular–but I think Keynes is brilliant in Chapter 13 of the General Theory:
It should be obvious that the rate of interest cannot be a return to saving or waiting as such. For if a man hoards his savings in cash, he earns no interest, though he saves just as much as before. On the contrary, the mere definition of the rate of interest tells us in so many words that the rate of interest is the reward for parting with liquidity for a specified period. For the rate of interest is, in itself, nothing more than the inverse proportion between a sum of money and what can be obtained for parting with control over the money in exchange for a debt for a stated period of time.
        "As I put it in my neglected dissertation, the rate of interest is an exchange rate between present and future dollars (or euros or ounces of gold or whatever the money commodity is). Austrians wouldn’t explain the exchange rate between the USD and the Japanese yen by reference to “proximity preference,” or the fact that consumers subjective prefer, other things equal, American goods to Japanese goods."
        "Obviously, I don’t endorse Keynes’ nutjob “socialization of investment” stuff in the final chapter, or any of his policy recommendations for that matter. But on his neutral, scientific assessment of what interest is, I actually agree with him more than Mises."
        "Believe me, it pains me to say that. I feel like this guy."
         http://consultingbyrpm.com/blog/2011/07/is-keynes-from-heaven-or-hell.html
        LK suggests Mosler go right here in the debate: how is he so able to reject Keynes' "nutjob" policy reccomendations so easily in light of agreeing with him on interest rates?
     " Mosler should point out that Murphy agrees with Keynes on the nature of the interest rate. So does Murphy admit that Keynesians are right in their interest rate theory?"
      "The instant Murphy attempts to explain recessions in terms of the Austrian business cycle theory (ABCT), Mosler should demand to know what version of the ABCT Murphy is using."

       Of course, Major Freedom was on the warpath after the above piece by Murphy:

       "Nooooooooooooo!"

       "That’s Bob as he realizes that in his slip into the dark side, he lost the most important thing."
       "Yes, the nominal rate of interest on loans is the difference between money received in the future versus money given up in the present. But this difference cannot possibly be a product of liquidity preference, for this difference is not between what is hoarded and what is consumed and invested. It is the difference between what is consumed and invested only."
         Major then starts talking about two different economies-can you make sense of this?
         " Imagine everyone in the economy hoarding maximum cash, and investing the minimum and consuming the maximum out of the remainder, versus an economy where everyone is hoarding minimum cash, and investing the minimum and consuming the maximum out of the remainder."
         "To give some numbers to this, imagine in the first economy everyone comes to hoard $900 each, and they earn $100 per period, which they invest $10 and consume $90. In the second economy, everyone comes to hoard only $100, and they earn $900 each period, which they invest $100 and consume $900."
            I don't get this division between hoarding and earning. After all, just because you're hoarding money doesn't mean you didn't earn it. He then goes on and on and on-if you know the Major this is no surprise. Murphy himself answers him:
            "MF, I’m just being honest with you here, I come to my blog when I’m taking a break from “real work.” Your posts are too long for me to even read, because I know it would take me longer than the 5 minutes I want to devote to the break. So that’s why I don’t grapple with you often (esp. on the Sunday posts). If you have 18 reasons that I’m wrong, just post the top 2."
             I guess however Bob will answer Mosler if he questions him on interest rates, he won't be using Major's. 
         

Friday, March 29, 2013

Are Capital Controls a Human Rights Violation?

     So suggests Jon Danielsson and Yves Smith is not too impressed by this. She doesn't like his article as a whole but she can't put her finger on what exactly is wrong. She offers it up for Naked Capitalism readers to analyze:

     "Yves here. I’m interested in getting informed reader responses to this post. While the conclusion may not be wrong, what bothers me is the lack of analysis supporting its conclusions. This just looks like applying neoliberal ideology to Iceland’s situation. Capital controls bad! See, we had a bad outcome! Must be due to those bad capital controls!"

      "Ahem. Iceland’s central bank failed and the country fell into a deep contraction. This isn’t a great climate for attracting investment. Even if you are confident that are buying something cheap, if it takes a long time for the economy to improve and your asset to appreciate, you would have been better off doing something else. And in this time period, there were lots of economies with better-looking prospects than Iceland. Put it another way, the author observes a correlation between the imposition of capital controls and a low level of foreign direct investment and treats it as causal. He never considers that both may be the effect of a monster financial crisis."

       Read more at http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2013/03/the-capital-controls-in-cyprus-and-the-icelandic-experience.html#dgohi8v0kpjo5QiQ.99    

     The actual title of this post, however, was inspired by something the NC commentator lolcar said:

      "Whatever the economic pros and cons, construing capital controls as a human rights violation is just some world-class chutzpah."

       I don't know that it's so abusrd. If tomorrow the bank told you they weren't going to give you your money back or were going to hold on to it and dole it out in very small amounts you might feel that this was a pretty big outrage-maybe even the word "humans right violation" wouldn't sound so outrageous to you. I don't know whether I would call it that-it might depend on the circumstances-but it doesn't seem absurd to do so. 

        However, let's get to what Danielsson actually says. He starts out:

         "Cyprus has imposed temporary capital controls. This column sheds light on how temporary and how damaging they are likely to be, based on Iceland’s experience. The longer controls exist, the harder they are to abolish. Icelandic capital controls, which have been ‘temporary’ for half a decade, deeply damage the economy by discouraging investment. We can only hope the authorities that created the chaos in the first place realise that temporary really needs to mean temporary."

          It seems to me that capital controls are something that were necessary for Iceland under the circumstances-they actually had the IMF's blessing. In the normal way you wouldn't want this for 5 years but this is not normal times in Iceland-or Cyprus. 

          Here I think Ives is right. Danielsson seems to not consider that correlation doesn't prove causation:

          "The Icelandic capital controls have proven to be highly damaging for its economy; investment has collapsed and is just about the lowest in Europe at 14.4% of GDP in 2013, compared to the EU average of 18%. The reason is that foreign direct investment almost completely dried up and any domestic residents with money left over prefer to keep their funds liquid, ready to be exported when an opportunity presents itself. Domestic investment is not compatible with that objective."

          The fact that investment has collapsed in Iceland-some in the comments don't like FDI in principle-is not due to the controls. It would have collapsed in any case. As she points out it's hardly been a choice spot for foreign investors the last 5 years. 

          Here I have to admit, he's quite obtuse:

          "The capital controls violate EU laws regarding the principle of the four freedoms – free movement of goods, capital, services, and persons. The Cypriot capital controls will violate at least two of these principles, just as the Icelandic ones do. The free movement of capital is prevented by the controls."

          "Even more seriously, it violates the free movement of persons, and hence the human rights of people subject to capital controls. If one cannot sell one’s house and use the money to buy a house abroad, movement across borders is restricted. If one cannot take money out of the country, the ability to travel and live wherever one wants in the EU is restricted. Trying to restrict outflows to those for only ‘legitimate’ reasons will not work. One can always find someone with a legit reason to export money."

          "The fact that the European authorities stand so ready to abandon their fundamental principles in order to address a temporary, and relatively small, economic problem is a cause for concern."

          I think the key is that in general capital controls on how much of your own money you can move is not a good thing. However, this is not a general case. He also keeps making it sound as if the controls caused the problem which is mixing up causality:

           "It would have been much better for the IMF, the EU and the Cypriot government to accept the short-term outflow of money after the banks opened; this would have meant a much quicker return to normality. Instead, it will become harder and harder to lift the controls as economic uncertainty is likely to continue increasing."

          "We can only hope for the sake of the Cypriots that the capital controls are truly temporary, that the authorities that created the chaos in the first place realise that temporary really needs to mean temporary."

           He's shifting the blame to the authorities already when the controls have just been implemented. In my piece about controls the other day.  It's also rich for him to be worrying about breaking EU rules as if their track record in any way validates them. Woj argued that usually they're not a good thing but for small economies they can be. It's also rich to be worrying about breaking EU rules: as if their track record in anyway justifies them. 

          "I don't think free flow of financial capital is too much of an issue for the US and other large countries. However if you look at smaller developed and developing countries (where external financial capital flows can be multiples of GDP), than some form of managed trade may be desirable."

          "Cyprus' issue isn't that Russians were buying to many goods and services from them or that Cyprus was purchasing too many goods and services from Greece. The trouble was huge financial inflows to Cyprus being invested with leverage in Greece sovereign debt, housing, etc. Similar issues were behind the Asian currency crises and numerous others in recent decades."


          http://diaryofarepublicanhater.blogspot.com/2013/03/is-unrestricted-free-trade-and-idea.html

          There seems to me to be something to that. The U.S. since WWII has been know as the greatest proponent of free trade, however prior to WWII it had actually been quite protectionist. Krugman suggests that the rigidity on this is likely to relax a little more in th future-it already has with the EU and IMF accepting the controls:

          "Whatever the final outcome in the Cyprus crisis — we know it’s going to be ugly; we just don’t know exactly what form the ugliness will take — one thing seems certain: for the time being, and probably for years to come, the island nation will have to maintain fairly draconian controls on the movement of capital in and out of the country. In fact, controls may well be in place by the time you read this. And that’s not all: Depending on exactly how this plays out, Cypriot capital controls may well have the blessing of the International Monetary Fund, which has already supported such controls in Iceland."

       "That’s quite a remarkable development. It will mark the end of an era for Cyprus, which has in effect spent the past decade advertising itself as a place where wealthy individuals who want to avoid taxes and scrutiny can safely park their money, no questions asked. But it may also mark at least the beginning of the end for something much bigger: the era when unrestricted movement of capital was taken as a desirable norm around the world."

      "It wasn’t always thus. In the first couple of decades after World War II, limits on cross-border money flows were widely considered good policy; they were more or less universal in poorer nations, and present in a majority of richer countries too. Britain, for example, limited overseas investments by its residents until 1979; other advanced countries maintained restrictions into the 1980s. Even the United States briefly limited capital outflows during the 1960s."
      "Over time, however, these restrictions fell out of fashion. To some extent this reflected the fact that capital controls have potential costs: they impose extra burdens of paperwork, they make business operations more difficult, and conventional economic analysis says that they should have a negative impact on growth (although this effect is hard to find in the numbers). But it also reflected the rise of free-market ideology, the assumption that if financial markets want to move money across borders, there must be a good reason, and bureaucrats shouldn’t stand in their way."
       "As a result, countries that did step in to limit capital flows — like Malaysia, which imposed what amounted to a curfew on capital flight in 1998 — were treated almost as pariahs. Surely they would be punished for defying the gods of the market!"
      "But the truth, hard as it may be for ideologues to accept, is that unrestricted movement of capital is looking more and more like a failed experiment."
       http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/25/opinion/krugman-hot-money-blues.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&_r=2&

What Makes a Depression Lesser?

     Part of it depends what countries you're talking about. This Depression looks lesser when you compare the U.S. today with the U.S. in the 30s. We've heard some triumphalism from Sumner lately with the rising stock market and some healthy retail numbers he's argued this shows the fiscal multiplier is zero. After all, the  market hasn't missed a beat following the expiration of the payroll tax holiday and sequestration. Clearly, this is because of Bernanke's QEInfinity-right?

      http://www.themoneyillusion.com/?p=20364

     Today there was some triumphalism from Republicans: after all, things are looking pretty good one month into the sequester.

      http://diaryofarepublicanhater.blogspot.com/2013/03/are-republicans-winning-sequester-fight.html

       This seems to put those who oppose the sequester into the unedifying position of having to explain why things are so good. Which is hardly what I want to do. After all, I actually want things to keep getting better. Unlike the GOP I don't want the economy to tank for political gain.

        However, there is another narrative to explain why things aren't so bad: they actually are pretty bad. Again, it's all relative. Britain, for instance is in a pretty bad way, though they're in better shape than Europe. Still, even here this points out the stupidity of Britain's leadership. They imposed Greek austerity even though they're not Greece, they're nothing like Greece.

        Krugman points out that Europe's numbers don't look so good compared with the Great Depression. They didn't fall as far as in the 30s, but they're recovery has been much feebler-of course they had much further to come back in the 30s.

         "The timing is, I think, a bit off — Europe’s earlier slump began in 1929, but the later didn’t really begin until early 2008. Still, the basics won’t change. In the 30s there was a very severe initial slump, but a strong recovery after 1933 as one country after another went off gold and adopted reflationary policies. This time around, the initial slump wasn’t so bad, but recovery was hobbled by austerity policies, especially in countries on the euro, and has now stalled out completely. So Europe in 2013 is doing barely better than Europe in 1935 — and all indications are that by next year recovery will be lagging behind what was achieved in the Great Depression."

           http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/29/europes-second-depression/      

          Delong makes the case that our recovery hasn't been so earth shattering either-though a lot better than  Europe-the one eyed man is king... 

       "In the 12 years of the Great Depression – between the stock-market crash of 1929 and America’s mobilization for World War II – production in the United States averaged roughly 15% below the pre-depression trend, implying a total output shortfall equal to 1.8 years of GDP. Today, even if US production returns to its stable-inflation output potential by 2017 – a huge “if” – the US will have incurred an output shortfall equivalent to 60% of a year’s GDP."
     "In fact, the losses from what I have been calling the “Lesser Depression” will almost certainly not be over in 2017. There is no moral equivalent of war on the horizon to pull the US into a mighty boom and erase the shadow cast by the downturn; and when I take present values and project the US economy’s lower-trend growth into the future, I cannot reckon the present value of the additional loss at less than a further 100% of a year’s output today – for a total cost of 1.6 years of GDP. The damage is thus almost equal to that of the Great Depression – and equally painful, even though America’s real GDP today is 12 times higher than it was in 1929."

     "When I talk to my friends in the Obama administration, they defend themselves and the long-term macroeconomic outcome in the US by pointing out that the rest of the developed world is doing far worse. They are correct. Europe wishes desperately that it had America’s problems."
     "Nevertheless, my conclusion is that I should stop calling the current episode the Lesser Depression. Yes, its shape is different from that of the Great Depression; but, so far at least, there is no reason to rank it any lower in the hierarchy of macroeconomic disasters."
     "The US bond market agrees with me. Since 1975, the nominal annual premium on the 30-year Treasury bill has averaged 2.2%: in other words, over its lifespan, the 30-year nominal T-bill yields are 2.2 percentage points more than the expected average of future short-term nominal T-bill rates. The current 30-year T-bill yields 3.2% annually, which means that, unless the marginal bond buyer today is unusually averse to holding 30-year Treasuries, she anticipates that short-term nominal T-bill rates will average 1% per year over the next generation. The US Federal Reserve keeps the short-term nominal T-bill rate near 1% only when the economy is depressed, capacity is slack, labor is idle, and the principal risk is deflation rather than upward pressure on prices. Since WWII, the US unemployment rate has averaged 8% when the short-term nominal T-bill rate is 2% or lower."
That is the future that the bond market sees for America: a slack and depressed economy, if not for the next generation, at least for most of it.
     http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2013/03/the-north-atlantic-macroeconomy-let-it-bleed-we-are-live-at-project-syndicate.html
     During the recovery we've averaged GDP of about 2.2%. For a recovery that's very feeble, historically speaking. In the 30s we had some turbo charged growth-from a much lower starting point of course. Still it's hard to remember that in the 70s there was a lot of derision of the recovery from the 1975 recession-it was complained that we weren't garnering the kind of growth to bring down unemployment. Yet, then we were averaging over 4% GDP. That was considered too slow. Ultimately, Carter would be one of only 4 Administrations since the 60s to actually give us more jobs created than population growth-the other 3: Reagan, LBJ, and Clinton. 

     In any case this is a more sobering look. We do seem to be taking off and lets' hope we are. However, this has been a historically slow recovery even in the U.S. We're getting subpar growth while in Britain and Europe they're actually regressing. 

    I recently agreed with Tim Duy that we may not see another recession till 2017. This seems like a long time without a recession, but bear in mind that we had a lot to come back from in lost output. In the 30s it would be 8 years till the next recession. Yet Duy could be right and we would still be way behind where we should be. 

     http://diaryofarepublicanhater.blogspot.com/2013/03/on-recovery-ill-join-tim-duy-on-his-limb.html

      So one answer to why we're doing so well is that we're not. With more activist policy-particularly on the fiscal side-we'd be doing much better. While we haven't had Europe's level of austerity we haven't had the level of stimulus we should have. 

      Look at it this way. Even if we're not doing so bad with QEInfinity and a month into the sequester. Can really we say are better off if we had QEInfinity and no sequester? And can we say we would be better with QEInfinity and no sequester than the same but also passing the $100 billion in new stimulus spending Obama and the Dems have argued for?

     If we're 60% below trend as Delong shows could that gap possibly be less if we had more activist policy out of the Fed and Congress? To say that QEInfinity mitigated the effects of the sequester-bearing in mind we're only one month in-is not to say that the sequester was a good policy. No one claims that, not even the GOP though they also are claiming credit for it in their typically pique of cognitive dissonance. 

    To agree with Sumner though that we've now in the last 3 months proven that the fiscal multiplier is zero you have to show that the U.S. economy circa 2013 is a Panglossian Best of all Possible Worlds. Is anyone interested in making that case?